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DAILEY v. NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE: THE IMPACT OF
ERISA'S EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION ON THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCESS LIDA DOCTRINE IN AN
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS CONTEXT
I. INTRODUCTION
International law is a body of rules governing the relations be-
tween nations.' Nations must abide by the rules of international
law in order to co-exist harmoniously.2 The doctrine of comity is
one such rule of international law.3 The United States Supreme
Court described comity as "the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other per-
sons who are under the protection of its laws." 4 Thus comity may
require one nation to yield when there is a conflict between courts
in different countries. 5
In Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson,6 the Supreme
Court held that a federal court may not exercise jurisdiction over
an action for the administration of a trust if the plaintiff has a pend-
ing suit over the same trust in state court.7 The Princess Lida hold-
ing demonstrates that there are times when a federal court must
not exercise jurisdiction although it is otherwise authorized to exer-
cise jurisdiction. 8 In contrast to Princess Lida, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) 9 provides that federal courts
1. International Law: General Nature, 1 Hackworth DIGEST § 1, at 1; see also
International Law: General Nature, 1 Whiteman DIGEsr § 1, at 1.
2. See Hackworth, supra note 1, at 2-3.
3. See Whiteman, supra note 1, at 4.
4. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
5. For a discussion of yielding jurisdiction in the interest of comity, see infra
notes 77-81, 149-54 and accompanying text.
6. 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
7. Id. at 467-68. For a further discussion of Princess Lida, see infra notes 49-85
and accompanying text. Courts have also applied the Princess Lida doctrine to dis-
putes involving a foreign court. Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66
(2d Cir. 1991).
8. See Crawford v. Courtney, 451 F.2d 489, 492 (4th Cir. 1971) (stating that
application of Princess Lida is compulsory).
9. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
(91)
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have exclusive jurisdiction over certain disputes and, therefore,
must exercise jurisdiction over disputes involving the administra-
tion of a trust.10
ERISA does not address how a dispute over the administration
of a trust benefiting foreigners and United States citizens is treated
under ERISA's nearly complete grant of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion." A prime example of a trust that covers foreigners and
United States citizens is an international sports league's pension
plan. 12 If the participants in the international sports league include
United States citizens and foreign nationals, the league's pension
plan would apply to the citizens of many countries, including the
United States. As a result, there are several legal forums available to
settle a dispute over the same pension plan.' 3 Plaintiffs may wish to
have a dispute over a league pension plan settled in different fo-
rums, creating the possibility that conflicting orders could be
issued.14
In Dailey v. National Hockey League,'5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit decided a jurisdictional dispute over
the National Hockey League's pension plan.' 6 A suit over the same
plan was filed in Canada before the Dailey action was commenced.' 7
Because the Dailey plaintiffs alleged ERISA violations, the Third Cir-
cuit had to decide whether it had jurisdiction under ERISA or
10. For a discussion of exclusive federal jurisdiction provisions in ERISA, see
infra notes 86-118 and accompanying text. For a discussion of ERISA in general,
see BARBARAJ. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON ERISA (3d ed. 1989) andJoHN H. LANGBEIN &
BRUCE A. WOL, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENErTr LAW (1990).
11. ERISA does not, however, cover plans maintained outside the United
States primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b) (4) (1988).
12. The National Hockey League and Major League Baseball are two exam-
ples of international sports leagues with pension plans.
13. For instance, a Canadian player who plays for a team located in the
United States could file suit in either Canada or the United States.
14. For examples of other situations where conflicting orders may be granted,
see Yonkers Racing Corp. v. Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1077 (1989); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 383 (4th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Michigan, No. 77-71100, 1989 WL 155689
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 1989); Pumpelly v. Cook, 106 F.R.D. 238 (D.D.C. 1985); Com-
mon Cause v. Judicial Ethics Comm., 473 F. Supp. 1251 (D.D.C. 1979).
15. 987 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1993), rev' 780 F. Supp. 262 (D.NJ. 1991), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 67 (1993).
16. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 173. For a discussion of the facts in Dailey, see infra
notes 20-47 and accompanying text.
17. Bathgate v. National Hockey League Pension Soc'y, No. RE 785/91, 1992
Ont. CJ. LEXIS 1830 (Ont. CJ. Oct. 21, 1992). The Canadian suit was a represen-
tative action, the Canadian equivalent of a class action. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 174.
[Vol. I: p. 91
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lacked jurisdiction under the Princess Lida doctrine.1 8 The Third
Circuit held that Princess Lida controlled the issue and dismissed
the case. 19
This Note discusses Princess Lida and ERISA's exclusive federal
jurisdiction. First, this Note will demonstrate that the Princess Lida
doctrine has become a deeply entrenched principle in the United
States court system. Second, this Note will discuss how courts have
not opposed dismissing cases even though the court had exclusive
federal jurisdiction. Third, this Note will analyze whether the Third
Circuit properly applied the Princess Lida doctrine to dismiss Dailey.
Finally, this Note will discuss Dailey's impact on future cases involv-
ing ERISA and foreign jurisdictions.
II. FACTS
The National Hockey League (NHL) consists of professional
hockey teams from the United States and Canada. 20 The NHL's
players, coaches and administrators are natives of the United States,
Canada and many other countries.2 Although many of the teams
are located in the United States, more than fifty percent of the play-
ers on the teams located in the United States are foreign
nationals.22
18. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 177.
19. Id. at 178.
20. The teams located in the United States are the: Anaheim Mighty Ducks,
Boston Bruins, Buffalo Sabres, Chicago Blackhawks, Dallas Stars, Detroit Red
Wings, Florida Panthers, Hartford Whalers, Los Angeles Kings, New Jersey Devils,
New York Islanders, New York Rangers, Philadelphia Flyers, Pittsburgh Penguins,
St. Louis Blues, San Jose Sharks, Tampa Bay Lightning and Washington Capitals.
The teams located in Canada are the: Calgary Flames, Edmonton Oilers, Montreal
Canadians, Ottawa Senators, Quebec Nordiques, Toronto Maple Leafs, Vancouver
Canucks and Winnipeg Jets.
Anaheim, Florida, SanJose, Tampa Bay and Ottawa were not member clubs of
the NHL at the time Dailey was filed. Additionally, the Dallas Stars were called the
Minnesota North Stars when both suits were filed. See Kevin Allen, A Look at Pro-
spective Draftees, USA TODAY, May 30, 1991, at C8; Jim Kelley, Changes for '93-94
Should Improve Regular Season, Buw. NEws, Oct. 5, 1993, at 6; Paul Newman, Ice
Hockey: Dallas Upbeat About Move, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 6, 1993, at 36; Robyn Nor-
wood, Bill for Ducks' Opening Show Estimated at $450,000, L.A. TIME.S, Oct. 6, 1993, at
Al.
21. SeeJudith Waldrop, Hot-Weather Hockey, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1993, at
4.
22. See generally PHILADELPHIA FLYERS YARABOOK (1993-94). The Philadelphia
Flyers are an example of a United States team with players from different coun-
tries. At the beginning of the 1993-94 season, the Flyers had players from Canada,
Czechoslovakia, the former Soviet Union and Sweden. Id. The Flyers had no
United States citizens and only five Flyers lived in the United States. Id.
19941
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In 1967, the NHL formally established the National Hockey
League Pension Plan and Trust (NHL Plan).23 The NHL named
the National Hockey League Pension Society (Pension Society)
trustee of the NHL Plan.24 The NHL Plan specified that all surplus
plan funds and assets were to be used for the exclusive benefit of
plan participants. 25 Players and their respective teams made contri-
butions to the pension plan until 1969.26 After 1969, only the
teams made financial contributions to the NHL Plan.27
A substantial portion of the pension funds were invested in a
group annuity contract with Manufacturer's Life Insurance Com-
pany (Manulife).28 The contract stated that Manulife would at-
tempt to generate surplus funds for the pension plan.29 From its
establishment in 1967 until 1982, no significant changes were made
to the NHL Plan.30
23. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 174. The NHL established an unofficial pension plan
in 1947 with the National Hockey League Pension Society named as trustee. Bath-
gate v. National Hockey League Pension Soc'y, No. RE 785/91, 1992 Ont. CJ.
LEXIS 1830, at *6 (Ont. C.J. Oct. 21, 1992).
24. Dailey v. National Hockey League, 780 F. Supp. 262, 264 (D.N.J. 1991).
The Pension Society's main objective was to purchase annuity contracts and to pay
pensions to players, coaches and trainers employed by the NHL's member clubs.
Bathgate, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830, at *3.
25. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 174. Article 3.12 of the NHL Plan provided:
As of April 30, 1967 the Trustee shall allocate surplus funds, if any,
among the accounts of participating Players, Protected Players, or Accom-
modation Service Players .... Thereafter, at five year intervals, the
Trustee shall allocate surplus funds, if any, among the accounts of partici-
pating Players, Protected Players and Accommodation Service Players
who had been participants at any time since the immediately prior alloca-
tion of surplus funds.
Bathgate, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830, at *30-31. Article 4.01(3) further provides:
[N]o amendment shall provide for the use of funds or assets held under
the Club Pension Plan other than for the benefit of Participants, former
Participants or their beneficiaries, and no funds contributed or assets of
the Club Pension Plan shall ever revert to or be used or enjoyed by the
League or Member Clubs until after satisfaction of all liabilities under the
Club Pension Plan to Participants, former Participants and beneficiaries.
Id. at *33-34 (emphasis omitted).
26. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 174. In 1969, the National Hockey League Players'
Association (NHLPA) and the NHL teams agreed to no longer require the players
to contribute to the NHL Plan. Bathgate, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830, at *37.
27. Bathgate, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830, at *37. The players were excluded
from sitting on the Pension Society's Board of Directors because they no longer
contributed to the NHL Plan. Id.
28. Dailey, 780 F. Supp. at 264.
29. Id. The contract defined surplus funds as the rate of return on the funds
deposited in excess of the internal rate of return. Id.
30. Id. at 265. There were two small allocations of surplus funds to plan par-
ticipants in 1972. Id.
[Vol. I: p. 91
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In 1982, Manulife released nearly three million dollars of sur-
plus plan funds to the Pension Society.3' The Pension Society allo-
cated one million dollars to plan participants and allocated the
remainder to the NHL and its teams.3 2 In 1987, Manulife allocated
an additional twenty-four million dollars in surplus funds to the
Pension Society. 33 The Pension Society allocated less than four and
a half million dollars to plan participants and approximately sixteen
and a half million dollars to the member clubs.a4 Several retired
NHL players charged that the distribution to the member clubs vio-
lated the NHL Plan. 35 On April 26, 1991, several retired Canadian
players filed suit in the Ontario Court ofJustice. 36 On June 6, 1991,
several retired United States players brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey.37
In Bathgate v. National Hockey League Pension Society,38 the Cana-
dian plaintiffs alleged that the Pension Society distribution was a
breach of the contract and a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty
under Canadian common law.3 9 The plaintiffs sought relief which
included the following: (1) an order reallocating surplus funds
from the member clubs and the Pension Society to the plan partici-
pants and their beneficiaries; (2) an accounting of funds; (3) an
order replacing the Pension Society as trustee and (4) an order ap-
pointing a new trustee. 40 The Ontario Court of Justice granted the
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Manulife allocated the twenty-four million dollars in exchange for the
Pension Society's agreement to allow Manulife to convert the pension fund from a
participating to a nonparticipating group contract so that surplus funds would no
longer be generated under the plan. Id.
34. Id.
35. The named plaintiffs in the Canadian suit were: Andy Bathgate, Carl
Brewer, Gordie Howe, Bobby Hull, Al Stanley, Eddie Shack and Leo Reise. Bath-
gate, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830, at *1.
36. Id.
37. Dailey, 780 F. Supp. at 264. Bob Dailey and Reggie Leach were the named
plaintiffs in the United States suit. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 172. While the Canadian
players represented a class of players who retired before June 1982, Dailey and
Leach represented players who retired before 1988. Id. at 174. The parties to the
action, however, made no point of the distinction between the coverage of the two
classes in connection with the argument directed to the application of Princess
Lida. Id. at n.2. Furthermore, Dailey and Leach were included in the class repre-
sented in Bathgate. Brief for Appellees at 14, Dailey v. National Hockey League,
987 F.2d 172 (3d Cir.) (No. 92-5156), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 67 (1993).
38. No. RE 785/91, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830 (Ont. C.J. Oct. 21, 1992).
39. Id. at *75-76.
40. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 174-75. The Canadian plaintiffs also sought the follow-
ing relief: a declaration that the Pension Society and the NHL were in breach of
their legal and fiduciary duties for improperly allocating surplus funds; a declara-
1994]
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relief, except for the removal of the Pension Society as trustee of
the NHL Plan.41
In Dailey, the plaintiffs claimed that the Pension Society vio-
lated sections 1104, 1109 and 1103(c)(1) of ERISA.42 The Dailey
plaintiffs sought essentially the same relief as the Bathgate plaintiffs
despite the absence of a Canadian ERISA statute.43
The NHL moved to dismiss the players' complaint in Dailey,
but the district court denied the request.44 The NHL then filed an
interlocutory appeal. 45 In Dailey, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the district court's decision and dismissed the ac-
tion.46 The Third Circuit held that Princess Lida was applicable to
the Dailey pension plan dispute despite the ERISA claims and, as a
result, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.47
III. BACKGROUND
The United States' dual court system may create conflicts if
both a state and a federal court exercise jurisdiction over the same
property and issue conflicting orders. 48 In Princess Lida of Thurn &
don that any amendments allocating surplus to persons other than plan partici-
pants and their beneficiaries were null and void and attorney's fees. Id.
41. Bathgate, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830, at *186-89.
42. Dailey, 780 F. Supp. at 265.
43. Id. at 266. The Dailey plaintiffs requested the following relief:
1) an injunction prohibiting defendants from removing any more surplus
funds from the pension plan and prohibiting defendants from executing
any further amendments that are inconsistent with the 1967 Agreement;
2) an order directing defendants to provide... an accounting of all sur-
plus funds generated by the plan since its inception and directing that all
such funds be returned to the plan and allocated to plaintiffs' accounts;
3) an order directing defendants to reconvert the contract with Manulife
from a nonparticipating to a participating contract, to allocate all surplus
funds earned by such contract in the future to plaintiffs' accounts... ; 4)
an order removing the NHL Pension Society as trustee of the fund and
appointing a new trustee... ; 5) an award of money damages ... ; and 6)
an award of attorneys fees.
Id. at 265-66.
44. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 175. The district court held that dismissal was not war-
ranted under the Pincess Lida, forum non conveniens or Colorado River doctrines.
Dailey, 780 F. Supp. at 271, 273. The court was particularly concerned that the
plaintiffs would lose their ERISA claims if they were forced to have their case tried
only in Canada due to ERISA's exclusive jurisdiction provisions. Id. at 271. For a
discussion of the Colorado River doctrine, see infra notes 82-85 and accompanying
text. For a definition of forum non conveniens, see infra note 102.
45. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 173 (relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 178.
48. The holding of securities in escrow is an example of a conflict between
courts. A plaintiff may sue in federal court to recover the securities while the state
court is hearing a liquidation proceeding. A conflict could arise because both
[Vol. I: p. 91
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Taxis v. Thompson,49 the Supreme Court formulated a rule to re-
solve this conflict.50
A. Princess Lida
In Princess Lida, the Supreme Court reviewed a dispute over a
trust agreement that had been established by a divorce decree.51
When the ex-husband repudiated the trust agreement, his ex-wife,
Princess Lida, and their three sons brought suit seeking specific
performance of the terms of the trust agreement.52 The trial court
upheld the agreement, ordered an accounting and removed the ex-
husband as trustee. 53 The trial court also retained jurisdiction over
the trust and the new trustees filed accounts5 4 with the court.5 5
In 1938, fifteen years after the first suit, Princess Lida and one
son brought an action in equity against the trustees in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania alleg-
ing mismanagement of the trust fund.56 Princess Lida requested
removal of the trustees and repayment of losses to the estate.57 The
Supreme Court held that the federal district court lacked subject
courts need to control the escrow account in order to grant relief. See Blackhawk
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Geeslin, 530 F.2d 154, 156-59 (5th Cir. 1967).
49. 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
50. Id. at 466.
51. Id. at 458. The trust agreement provided that profits derived from the ex-
husband's partnerships would be used to make support payments. Id. The ex-
husband was required to pay the trustees an annuity of $15,000 for the first three
years and $20,000 a year thereafter. Id. He was required to pay any difference
between the amount of the annuity and one-third of his share of the partnerships'
profits annually until a fund was established in the hands of the trustees amount-
ing to $300,000. Id.
52. Id. Princess Lida and her sons brought the suit in equity in the Common
Pleas Court of Fayette County, Pennsylvania. Id.
53. Id.
54. A trustee files an account to communicate information concerning the
administration of a trust. PENNSYLVANIA BAR INST., FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING: THE
APPROVAL PROCESS 1 (1991). The account is a written summary of receipts and
disbursements made by the trustee during administration and net balances re-
maining in the trustee's hands. Id. In Pennsylvania, trustees must file an account
of their administration whenever directed to do so by the court or at any other
time. Id.; see 20 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 7181 (Supp. 1993) (effective 1978). For
more information on the filing of accounts, see generally ROBERT WHrrmAN & LAW-
RENCE J. KRAMER, FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING GUIDE (1990).
55. Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 459.
56. Id.
57. Id. Princess Lida and her son alleged that the trustees made unfit invest-
ments, failed to render proper accounts and were unfit to act as trustees. Thomp-
son v. Fitzgerald, 198 A. 58, 61 (Pa. 1938), affd sub nom. Princess Lida of Thurn &
Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
1994]
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matter jurisdiction because the earlier state accounting action and
the later federal action were both quasi-in rem.58
The Supreme Court based its holding in Princess Lida on the
common law rule that if two suits are in rem or quasi-in rem ac-
tions, courts must yield to the court which first exercised its jurisdic-
tion. 59 This common law rule was well-established prior to Princess
Lida.60 The Princess Lida doctrine will not apply, however, if either
one of the suits is an in personam action. 61
In an in rem action, the court must have possession or control
of the property that is the subject of the suit in order to grant the
58. Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 467-68. In holding that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court stated that:
The Common Pleas Court could not effectively exercise the jurisdiction
vested in it, without a substantial measure of control of the trust funds.
Its proceedings are.., quasi in rem, and the jurisdiction acquired upon
the filing of the trustees' account is exclusive. The District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania is without jurisdiction of the suit subse-
quently brought for the same relief, and the petitioners were properly
enjoined from further proceeding in that court.
Id.
59. Id. at 466; see generally 14 CHARLEs A. WRGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3631 (1976).
60. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 175; see United States v. Bank of NewYork & Trust Co.,
296 U.S. 463, 477 (1936) ("If the two suits are in rem or quasi in rem ... the jurisdic-
tion of one court must of necessity yield to that of the other."); Penn Gen. Casualty
Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935) ("[]f the two suits are
in ren or quasi in rem ... To avoid unseemly and disastrous conflicts.., the court
first assuming jurisdiction ... over the property may maintain and exercise that
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.") (citations omitted); Kline v. Burke Con-
str. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922) ("[W] here the action is one in rem that court -
whether state or federal - which first acquires jurisdiction draws to itself the exclu-
sive authority to control and dispose of the res. .. ").
61. Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 466. The Court stated: "[If] thejudgment sought
is strictly in personam, both the state court and the federal court, having concur-
rent jurisdiction, may proceed with the litigation at least until judgment is ob-
tained in one of them which may be set up as resjudicata in the other." Id. at 466
n.17 (citing United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 477
(1936); Palmer v. Texas, 212 U.S. 118, 129 (1909); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Lake St. Elevated RR., 177 U.S. 51, 61 (1900)).
An action is in personam if it is brought "to enforce personal rights and obli-
gations brought against the person and based on jurisdiction of the person."
Brooks v. United States, 833 F.2d 1136, 1143 (4th Cir. 1987). For examples of
cases that did not apply the Princess Lida doctrine because at least one of the ac-
tions was in personam, see Southwestern Bank & Trust Co. v. Metcalf State Bank,
525 F.2d 140, 143 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that federal action for money damages
against trustee was in personam and, therefore, could proceed despite state liqui-
dation action); Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding that
action to determine personal rights under written instrument was in personam
and, therefore, both federal and state actions could proceed); Koller v. Richmond
Indus. Loan & Thrift, 407 F. Supp. 1211, 1212 (E.D. Va. 1975) (holding that action
to impose joint and several liability was in personam and, therefore, both federal
and state actions could proceed).
[Vol. I: p. 91
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relief requested by the plaintiff.62 In a quasi-in rem action, the ac-
tion is brought personally against the defendant, but the defend-
ant's interest in the property serves as the basis for the court's
jurisdiction. 63 In a quasi-in rem action, as in an in rem action, the
court must have control of the property at issue in order to grant
the relief requested. 64 The administration of a trust is a classic ex-
ample of a quasi-in rem action. 65
The Princess Lida doctrine has become firmly rooted in the
United States court system.66 For example, in Ewald v. Citizens Fidel-
ity Bank & Trust Co.,67 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a complaint
based on the Princess Lida doctrine. 68 Ewald, like Dailey, involved a
dispute over the administration of a trust.69 The plaintiffs in Ewald
first filed suit in state court on August 1, 1955.70 Subsequently, they
filed suit in federal court on January 17, 1956, presenting the same
62. Penn Gen. Casualty, 294 U.S. at 195 (involving liquidation of insurance
company).
63. BLACK'S LAw DIcToNARY 1245 (6th ed. 1990); see also Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 199 n.17 (1977). For convenience, courts often use the term in rem
in place of in rem and quasi-in rem. See id.
64. Penn Gen. Casualty, 294 U.S. at 195.
65. See Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 467. The Court stated:
We have said that the principle applicable to both federal and state courts
that the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may maintain and
exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other, is not restricted to
cases where property has been actually seized under judicial process
before a second suit is instituted, but applies as well where suits are
brought to marshal assets, administer trusts, or liquidate estates, and in
suits of a similar nature where, to give effect to its jurisdiction, the court
must control the property.
Id. at 466; see, e.g., Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Geeslin, 530 F.2d 154,
157 (7th Cir. 1976); Ewald v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 242 F.2d 319, 321
(6th Cir. 1957); Swanson v. Bates, 170 F.2d 648, 651 (10th Cir. 1948); Asbestos
Workers Local 14 v. Hargrove, No. CIV.A.93-0728, 1993 WL 183990, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
May 25, 1993); Shaw v. First Interstate Bank, 695 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (W.D. Wis.
1988).
66. Beach v. Rome Trust Co., 269 F.2d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1959) ("[Princess Lida]
is so firmly rooted in our law as to have required and not merely permitted [the
court] to dismiss the plaintiff's claims insofar as [she] sought an accounting of the
estate and trust.").
67. 242 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1957).
68. Id. at 321.
69. Id. at 320. In 1935, Sterling Ewald executed an inter vivos trust agreement
conveying most of his personal estate to Citizens Fidelity Bank (Citizens) as trustee.
Id. The trust agreement provided for payments from the trust's funds to Sterling's
wife, Florence and his son Gerald. Id. When Sterling Ewald died in 1955, the
trust's property was transferred by Citizens as inter vivos trustee to itself as executor
of Sterling Ewald's estate. Id.
70. Id.
1994]
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claims as they did in state court.71 The Sixth Circuit held that be-
cause both actions were quasi-in rem, the federal court had to yield
to the pending litigation in the state court.72
A more recent example than Ewald is Asbestos Workers Local 14 v.
Hargrove,73 in which the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that the Princess Lida doctrine applied
to the dispute and dismissed the complaint.74 The Hargrove court
held that because the state court exercised its jurisdiction first and
the action was in rem, the Princess Lida doctrine mandated the dis-
missal of the subsequent federal litigation involving the same
assets.
7 5
As the Supreme Court stated in Princess Lida, its doctrine is
"necessary to the harmonious cooperation of federal and state
tribunals."76 As several courts have stated, one court must yield to
the other in the interest of comity to prevent conflicting judgments
concerning the same trust res.77 This interest in comity encom-
passes not only relations between federal and state courts, but also
relations between United States and foreign courts. 78 In Chesley v.
71. Id. at 321.
72. Id. at 321-22.
73. No. CIV.A.93-0728, 1993 WL 183990 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 1993). In Hargrove,
the plaintiff sought the release of funds seized during a state receivership action.
Id. at *1-2.
74. Id. at *5.
75. Id.; see Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 822 (1976); Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964); Chesley v. Union
Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co.
v. Geeslin, 530 F.2d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1976); Southwestern Bank & Trust Co. v.
Metcalf State Bank, 525 F.2d 140, 141-42 (10th Cir. 1975); Miller v: Miller, 423 F.2d
145, 146-47 (10th Cir. 1970); Shaw v. First Interstate Bank, 695 F. Supp. 995, 998
(W.D. Wis. 1988).
76. Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 466 (citing United States v. Bank of New York &
Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 478 (1936)). The Supreme Court articulated the necessity
for harmony between different jurisdictions:
This principle is applied in the discharge of the long recognized duty of
this court to give effect to such "methods of procedure as shall serve to
conciliate the distinct and independent tribunals of the States and of the
Union, so that they may cooperate as harmonious members of a judicial
system coextensive with the United States."
Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. at 477-78 (quoting Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 583, 595 (1857)).
77. See Crawford v. Courtney, 451 F.2d 489, 491 (4th Cir. 1971) ("Comity is the
heart of this historic rule."); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Merkle-Korff In-
dus., 503 F. Supp. 168, 169-70 (D.N.H. 1980) ("This court may ... for reasons of
comity and efficiency stay an action when a suit is pending in a state court between
the same parties which will conveniently and authoritatively dispose of the issues in
dispute between the federal litigants.").
78. See Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, 412 F.2d 577, 578 (Ist
Cir. 1969) ("[T] he direct effect of the district court's action on the jurisdiction of a
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Union Carbide Corp.,79 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit stated that, for comity reasons, the Princess Lida doc-
trine should apply whenever plaintiffs "requested interference by
American courts with a res under the jurisdiction of a foreign
court." 0 On that basis, the Second Circuit held that a United
States court should not interfere with a settlement fund supervised
by the Supreme Court of India.81
A dismissal based on the Princess Lida doctrine should not be
confused with the abstention doctrine formulated by the Supreme
Court in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States.8 2
In Colorado River, the Supreme Court held that when there is con-
current federal and state jurisdiction, the federal district court may
abstain from hearing the case for reasons of "wise judicial adminis-
tration."8 3 The Supreme Court listed factors that district courts
foreign sovereign requires that such action be taken only with care and great re-
straint."); Brinco Mining Ltd. v. Federal Ins. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C.
1982) (holding that for reasons of comity federal courts should defer to Canadian
court and dismiss case).
79. 927 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1991).
80. Id. at 66. The Second Circuit reasoned that principles of comity require
greater deference to foreign courts, stating: "It is not the business of our courts to
assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of an-
other sovereign nation. Such an assumption would directly conflict with the prin-
ciple of comity." Id. (quotingJhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d. Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976)).
81. Chesey, 927 F.2d at 67. The suit in Chesey arose out of litigation resulting
from the gas leak disaster in Bhopal, India. Id. at 61; see In reUnion Carbide Corp.
Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). Litigation in India resulted in a large settle-
ment in favor of the Bhopal victims. Chesey, 927 F.2d at 61. In Ches/ey, the attor-
neys for the Bhopal plaintiffs moved to recover fees and expenses from the
settlement fund. Id. at 63-64.
82. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Princess Lida should also not be confused with three
traditional abstention doctrines: Putnam, Burford and Younger. For a discussion on
these abstention doctrines, see David J. McCarthy, Note, Preclusion Concerns as an
Additional Factor When Staying a Federal Suit in Deference to a Concurrent State Proceed-
ing, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 1183, 1185 n.9 (1985).
83. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18. In Colorado River, Colorado divided it-
self into seven Water Divisions. Id. at 804. The Water Divisions were created to
allocate scarce water resources. Id. at 804-05. On November 14, 1972, the federal
government filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado seeking declaration of the federal government's rights to waters in certain
rivers and their tributaries. Id. at 805. Shortly thereafter, one of the defendants in
the federal suit filed an application in state court seeking an order directing ser-
vice of process on the United States in order to make it a party to proceedings for
both state and federal claims. Id. at 806. The trial court dismissed the case stating
that the doctrine of abstention required deference to the concurrent proceedings
in state court. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re-
versed, holding that abstention was inappropriate. Id. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether abstention was appropriate. Id. The Court
then reversed the Tenth Circuit. Id. For a more detailed discussion on Colorado
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may use to determine when abstention is appropriate.8 4 While the
Court in Colorado River stated that abstention is within the court's
discretion, the Princess Lida doctrine is compulsory and mandates a
dismissal whenever two suits are brought in rem or quasi-in rem in
different jurisdictions. 5
B. ERISA's Exclusive Jurisdiction
In 1974, Congress passed ERISA in an effort to prevent abuse
and mismanagement in the private pension plan system.8 6 The fed-
eral courts have exclusive jurisdiction over most ERISA violations,8 7
except for section 1132(a) (1) (B) violations which are subject to
concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state courts. 8 All
other ERISA claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts.8 9 Actions brought under section 1132(a) (1) (B) are per-
sonal in nature, unlike other ERISA claims that allege violations of
a particular provision of ERISA or an ERISA plan. 90 Plaintiffs suing
River, see Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75
GEO. L.J. 99 (1986); David A. Sonenshein, Abstention: The Crooked Course of Colo-
rado River, 59 TUL. L. REv. 651 (1985).
84. The Supreme Court's factors included the following: the avoidance of
piecemeal litigation, the order in which jurisdiction was obtained and the incon-
venience of the federal forum. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819-20; see, e.g., Voktas,
Inc. v. Central Soya Co., 689 F.2d 103, 106 (7th Cir. 1982).
85. See Crawford v. Courtney, 451 F.2d 489, 492 (4th Cir. 1971). The Fourth
Circuit distinguished between "[violuntary abstention within the sound discretion
of the district court" and "compulsory Princess Lida - type abstention." Id.; see also
PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1973) (calling
Princess Lida "virtually mechanical in rem rule").
86. CoLEMAN, supra note 10 at v.
87. ERISA § 1132(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988). Section 1132(e)(1)
states:
Except for actions under subsection (a) (1) (B) of this section, the district
courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, bene-
ficiary, or fiduciary. State courts of competent jurisdiction and district
courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions
under subsection (a) (1) (B) of this section.
Id.
88. ERISA, § 1132(a) (1) (B).
89. See Livolsi v. Ram Constr. Co., 728 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1984). Accord-
ing to ERISA's legislative history, Congress granted the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction because most employee benefit plans were interstate in character and
Congress believed there was an essential need to provide for a uniform source of
law. HR. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655; see also Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension
Fund v. Olson Constr., Inc., No. 90 C 1905, 1991 WL 22521, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15,
1991) (stating that Congress granted exclusive federal jurisdiction over most ERISA
claims to cultivate uniformity, expertise and sometimes to provide liberal federal
protections).
90. ERISA, § 1132(a)(1) (B); see Livolsi, 728 F.2d at 602.
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under section 1132 (a) (1) (B) seek: 1) to declare the plaintiff benefi-
ciary's rights under the plan; 2) to recover benefits personally due
to the plaintiff beneficiary or 3) to enforce personal rights to a
plan.9 1
In other contexts, federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction
have taken different approaches in deciding whether dismissal is
appropriate.92 In Levy v. Lewis,93 for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "[w] here exclu-
sive jurisdiction exists, only the federal courts can provide affirma-
tive relief."94 Levy involved a dispute over the termination of
retirement benefits of retired employees of Consolidated Mutual
Insurance Company (CMIC). 95 Because CMIC was in poor finan-
cial condition, the New York State Superintendent of Insurance was
appointed by a state court as its rehabilitator. 96 CMIC's financial
position declined and the state court ordered the Superintendent
to liquidate CMIC.9 7 The Superintendent terminated the employ-
ees' retirement benefits and five retirees filed a Notice of Claim on
behalf of all retirees.9 8 The Superintendent denied the claims and
instituted proceedings in New York Supreme Court in order to have
the court approve his disallowance of the claims.9 9 Subsequently,
the retirees brought a class action against the Superintendent in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
91. Section 1132(a) (1) (B) provides that "[a] civil action may be brought by a
participant or beneficiary... to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the
plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." Id.
According to ERISA's legislative history, suits brought under § 1132(a) (1) (B) may
not involve a specific tide I provision of ERISA. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 327 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107.
92. While there have been many cases dealing with the applicability of the
Colorado River and forum non conveniens doctrines to claims within exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction, none until Dailey have dealt with these claims in a Princess Lida
context. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 178. For a definition of forum non conveniens, see
infra note 102.
93. 635 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1980).
94. Id. at 967; see also Minucci v. Agrama, 868 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding Colorado River doctrine inapplicable to copyright claim which was
within exclusive federal jurisdiction); Andrea Theatres, Inc. v. Theatre Confec-
tions, Inc., 787 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that "abstention is clearly im-
proper when a federal suit alleges claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts" in antitrust case).
95. Levy, 635 F.2d at 961.
96. Id. at 962.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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York, alleging that the termination of the retirement benefits vio-
lated ERISA sections 1132(a) (1) (B) and 1104.100
The forum non conveniens doctrine may sometimes be used to
dismiss cases where there is exclusive federal jurisdiction. In Howe
v. Goldcorp Investments, Ltd.,10 the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit held that the federal courts may invoke the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine102 to dismiss complaints, even if the
court has exclusive federal jurisdiction.10 3 In Howe, the plaintiff al-
leged that the defendants violated federal securities laws by failing
to adequately disclose their intentions, plans, objectives and other
circumstances related to their efforts to take over two Canadian
companies. 10 4 The enforcement provision of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 provides:
The district courts of the United States and United States
courts of any Territory or other place subject to the juris-
diction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.10 5
The court applied the enforcement section to the dispute in Howe
because the plaintiff alleged violations of section 78j (b), the Ex-
change Act's antifraud provision.'0 6 The Howe court held that
the use of the forum non conveniens doctrine to dismiss the case
was appropriate, despite section 78aa's exclusive jurisdiction
language. 10 7
100. Id. The district court dismissed the case. Id. at 961. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the Superintendent
could not be considered an ERISA fiduciary, thus there was no exclusive federaljurisdiction and the concurrent claims should be left to the state court. Id.
101. 946 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1172 (1992).
102. The forum non conveniens doctrine allows a court to decline jurisdic-
tion for prudential reasons, even though jurisdiction is otherwise authorized. Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947). Factors a court may consider
when determining whether to decline jurisdiction are: 1) whether the plaintiffs
could easily bring their suit in another forum or jurisdiction; 2) whether it would
be inconvenient or oppressive to force the defendants to appear in the initially
chosen forum and 3) whether the chosen forum and the lawsuit are so attenuated
that conducting the case in the chosen forum constitutes an imposition on the
court. Howe, 946 F.2d at 947.
103. Howe, 946 F.2d at 955.
104. Id. at 945.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988) (emphasis added).
106. Howe, 946 F.2d at 945 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)).
107. See id. at 955.
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Additionally, there have been cases where federal courts did
not have exclusive jurisdiction, but plaintiffs were nevertheless pre-
cluded from pursuing a claim in the United States because federal
courts declined to exercise jurisdiction. 10 8 In Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno,10 9 the Supreme Court stated that federal courts must con-
sider whether another jurisdiction would provide adequate relief,
when determining whether the court should exercise jurisdic-
tion.110 Under the holding in Piper, if adequate relief is available in
the other jurisdiction, the federal court should defer to that juris-
diction, even if it offers inferior relief."' Relying on Piper, the Fifth
Circuit, in Kempe v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 1 2 held that dis-
missal of a federal RICO case based on forum non conveniens was
appropriate despite any consequent loss of the plaintiff's RICO
claims."13 The Fifth Circuit found that the Bermuda courts had
competent jurisdiction because they were capable of granting ade-
quate relief." 4
108. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Kenner Prod.
Co. v. Societe Fonciere et Financiere Agache-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
109. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
110. Id. at 254. In Piper, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 238.
The wrongful death action arose from a plane crash that took place in Scotland.
Id. The decedents, as well as their heirs and next of kin, were Scottish citizens and
residents. Id. at 239. The aircraft that crashed was built in the United States but
was registered in Great Britain. Id. The British Department of Trade investigated
the accident and determined that a mechanical failure may have caused the crash.
Id. The plaintiff brought the action in the United States because its laws regarding
liability, capacity to sue and damages were more favorable than Scotland's laws. Id.
at 240. The district court dismissed the case on the grounds of forum non con-
veniens. Id. at 243-44. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the district court. Id. at 244. The Supreme Court reversed the Third
Circuit, holding that dismissal based on forum non conveniens may be granted
"even though the law applicable in the alternative forum is less favorable to the
plaintiff's chance of recovery." Id. at 250. The Supreme Court stated:
We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law
should never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry
.... [I]f the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inade-
quate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change
in law may be given substantial weight; the district court may conclude
that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice.
Id. at 254 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
111. See id.
112. 876 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 918 (1989).
113. Id. at 1146. Kempe involved alleged violations of federal mail and wire
fraud statutes by companies primarily located in Bermuda. Id. at 1140. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled that Ber-
muda was an adequate forum. Id. at 1141.
.114. Id. at 1146. The Court in Kempe stated: "Although the RICO cause of
action is not available in Bermuda, a forum is inadequate only where it would
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In Fleeger v. Clarkson Co.,' 15 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas dismissed a shareholder derivative
suit that had also been filed in Canada, based solely on principles of
comity with the Canadian court.' 16 The court dismissed the case
even though Canadian law placed more restrictions on shareholder
derivative suits than United States law placed on shareholder deriv-
ative suits." 7 The court held that the test was "whether the law of
Canada is against 'good morals or natural justice . . . or that for
some other reason the enforcement of it would be prejudicial to
the general interests of our own citizens."' 8 Thus courts have dis-
missed cases even though the plaintiffs lost the right to significant
claims.
IV. DiscussioN: DA.ImEY V. NATIONAL HocKEY LA CUE
In Dailey, the Third Circuit discussed the applicability of the
Princess Lida doctrine to ERISA claims when a federal court and a
foreign court have concurrent jurisdiction. 19 In determining this
issue of first impression the Third Circuit discussed: 1) the impact
that the loss of ERISA claims would have on the plaintiffs; 2) the
potential for conflict with the Canadian court if the federal court
exercised jurisdiction and 3) the similarities between Dailey and
Howe v. Goldcorp Investments, Ltd.120
afford a plaintiff no remedy at all." Id. Because Bermuda permitted litigation in
its courts for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and
piercing the corporate veil, the Bermuda courts had the power to "see to it that
defendants make good of whatever harm they did." Id. at 1145 (quoting Kempe v.
Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 683 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (E.D. La. 1988)); see
also Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir.
1991) ("Even if the RICO and Lanham Act claims were unavailable in Japan, that
would not furnish a sufficient reason to preclude dismissal.").
For an example of a foreign court that did not provide adequate relief, see
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding no equivalent
to antitrust suit).
115. 86 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
116. Id. at 392-93. The plaintiff brought the derivative suit on behalf of a
Canadian corporation. Id. at 390. The suit claimed a breach of fiduciary duty by
the receiver appointed by the Ontario Court of Justice. Id. at 390-91.
117. Id. at 394.
118. Id. (quoting Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. 1967))(al-
teration in original); accord Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB,
773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1985); DeYoung v. Beddome, 707 F. Supp. 132, 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Kenner Prod. Co. v. Societe Fonciere et Financiere
Agache-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Comity is to be accorded a
decision of a foreign court so long as that court is a court of competentjurisdiction
and as long as the laws and public policy of the forum state and the rights of its
residents are not violated.").
119. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 178.
120. See id. at 177-79.
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The Third Circuit initially addressed the applicability of the
Princess Lida doctrine to Dailey.121 The court held that the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey erred by not ap-
plying the Princess Lida doctrine to the case. 122 Using what it
termed a "pragmatic" approach, 23 the district court concluded that
there was no danger that the two courts would issue conflicting or-
ders despite the fact that the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in
both the Canadian and United States actions.' 24 The Third Circuit
disagreed with the lower court, stating that the Princess Lida doc-
trine is a mechanical rule and must be applied because both actions
were quasi-in rem.125
The Third Circuit next addressed the impact that the loss of
ERISA claims would have on the applicability of the Princess Lida
doctrine. 26 The court found that the district court erroneously re-
121. Id. at 175. The Third Circuit confined its discussion of Princess Lida to
the following passage:
We have said that the principle applicable to both federal and state courts
that the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may maintain and
exercise thatjurisdiction to the exclusion of the other, is not restricted to
cases where property has been actually seized . . .but applies as well
where suits are brought to marshal assets, administer trusts, or liquidate
estates, and in suits of a similar nature where, to give effect to its jurisdic-
tion, the court must control the property.
Id. (quoting Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 466). For a discussion of Princess Lida, see
supra notes 49-85 and accompanying text.
122. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 176. The district court distinguished Princess Lida on
the ground that Princess Lida required "more comprehensive control by the court
over the administration of the trust" than Dailey required. Dailey, 780 F. Supp. at
267.
123. Under the "pragmatic" approach the district court would not issue or-
ders of relief that conflicted with the Canadian court's order. Dailey, 780 F. Supp.
at 268.
124. Id.
125. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 176. The Third Circuit found that the actions were
quasi-in rem because "[t] he primary relief sought in both actions [was] the restora-
tion of trust funds which were allegedly misappropriated." Id. at 177. The court
stated that "[t]his is precisely the situation which was at issue in Princess Lida and
which the court stated was encompassed within the term quasi in rem" Id. The
Third Circuit also found that the Canadian court would need to control the Plan's
res because the Canadian suit sought restoration of the principal, injunctive relief,
an accounting and removal of the trustee. Id. Because similar relief was sought in
Dailey, the district court would be required to "exercise control over the same
property that is subject to the control of the Canadian court as well as requiring it
to determine the future status of the incumbent Canadian trustee." Id. The Third
Circuit found this was the "type of disharmony the Princess Lida Court sought to
avoid." Id.
126. Id. The plaintiffs lost their ERISA claims because they could only litigate
those claims in federal court. Furthermore, the Canadian court issued a court
order providing that the plaintiffs were not permitted to litigate their ERISA
claims. Brief for Appellees at 24, Dailey v. National Hockey League, 987 F.2d 172
(3d Cir.) (No. 92-5156), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 67 (1993).
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lied 127 on Levy v. Lewis.128 The Third Circuit held that Levy was
inapplicable to Dailey because the court in Levy discussed the ERISA
claims subject to exclusive jurisdiction in a discretionary Colorado
River context, not in a compulsory Princess Lida context. 129
The Third Circuit concluded that Dailey must be dismissed to
avoid the potential for conflicting orders despite the "strong public
policy reflected in ERISA designed to protect pension rights."130 If
either the district court or the Canadian court ordered a realloca-
tion of trust funds, the other court would have to agree or there
would be a conflict between the two courts.13' Because this conflict
was an essential factor in the formulation of the Princess Lida doc-
trine, the Third Circuit held that Princess Lida should be applied to
the case even though the ERISA claims would be lost.' 32 Further-
more, the court found that the retired NHL players would not be
prejudiced by the loss of ERISA claims because Canadian law of-
fered adequate relief.'33
Finally, the court discussed Howe v. Goldcorp Investments, Ltd.134
The court in Howe allowed dismissal of exclusive jurisdiction claims
on forum non conveniens grounds. 135 The Third Circuit found it
"difficult to see how dismissal could be possible under forum non
conveniens but at the same time not an available remedy under Prin-
cess Lida."136
127. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 177.
128. 635 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of Levy, see supra notes 93-
100 and accompanying text.
129. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 178. For a discussion of Colorado River, see supra notes
82-85 and accompanying text. Levy also dealt with abstention under the Younger
doctrine. Levy, 635 F.2d at 964 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
Under the Younger abstention doctrine, "a federal court should not entertain suits
challenging state action when the state has already initiated proceedings in the
state courts in which the plaintiff is able to raise federal claims." Levy, 635 F.2d at
964.
130. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 178.
131. See Bathgate, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830, at *186-88. The Canadian judg-
ment prohibiting the removal of the Pension Society as trustee might conflict with
a district court order finding removal appropriate.
132. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 178.
133. See Bathgate, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830, at *186-88; see also Dailey, 987
F.2d at 175 (noting that plaintiffs in United States suit sought essentially same
relief as plaintiffs in Canadian suit).
134. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 178. For a discussion of Howe, see supra notes 101-07
and accompanying text.
135. Howe, 946 F.2d at 955.
136. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 179. The Third Circuit did not discuss Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In Shaffer, the Supreme Court held that, for purposes of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a state court could not
mechanically use property located in the state to establish the minimum contacts
necessary to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. at 203-04. Thus,
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Judge Alito dissented from the majority's holding in Dailey.137
Judge Alito stated that the Princess Lida doctrine only prevents con-
flicts between federal and state courts, not between United States
and foreign courts.13 8 In addition, Judge Alito stated that it should
make no difference that Canadian law is similar to ERISA because
Congress clearly intended ERISA to govern all pension plans, in-
cluding the NHL Plan.' 3 9 Judge Alito concluded that the district
court's pragmatic approach was preferable to the majority's
mechanical approach. 140 According to Judge Alito, the pragmatic
approach could accommodate the comity principles underlying the
Princess Lida doctrine without sacrificing ERISA protections.' 4 '
V. ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit properly dismissed the plaintiffs' case in Dai-
ley. Because a dispute over the administration of the NHL Plan is a
quasi-in rem action, the Princess Lida doctrine must be applied. ER-
ISA's exclusive jurisdiction provision does not bar the application
of Princess Lida because comity dictates that United States courts
should not interfere with the proceedings or decisions of foreign
courts.
for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction, the test is the same whether the
action is brought in personam, in rem or quasi-in rem. In Shaffer, however, the
property was not the subject matter of the litigation, nor was the underlying cause
of action related to the property. Id. at 213. Therefore, the factual situation in
Shaffer was different from the factual situations in Princess Lida and Daily, where
the properties were the subject matter of the litigation. Furthermore, the mechan-
ical test in Princess Lida and Dailey was used to determine whether jurisdiction
should be declined, not to determine whether jurisdiction existed in the first
place, as was the case in Shaffer. For more detailed discussions of Shaffer, see Linda
J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33 (1978);
David H. Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction -A Speculation on the
Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 273 (1978).
137. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 179 (Alito, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 179 (Alito, J., dissenting). Judge Alito believed that Chesley v.
Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1991) stood for the proposition that
federal courts should be reluctant to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if doing so
would interfere with a foreign court's jurisdiction over a res. Id. at 179 n.2 (Alito,
J., dissenting). Judge Alito did not believe that the court in Chesley interpreted the
Princess Lida doctrine as requiring the automatic dismissal of an action in a United
States court if the dismissal resulted in the loss of important federal statutory
rights. Id. (Alito,J., dissenting).
139. Dailey, 987 F.2d at 179 (Alito, J., dissenting). Judge Alito clearly pre-
ferred statutory to judge-made law. See id. at 179-80 (Alito, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 179 (Alito, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 180 (Alito,J., dissenting). The district court proposed that it retain
jurisdiction while it monitored developments in the Canadian litigation and ad-
dressed any conflicting orders should they arise. Id. at 178-79 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
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A. Princess Lida and Comity
The actions in both Dailey and Bathgate were quasi-in rem be-
cause they involved the administration of a trust.142 In Princess Lida,
the Supreme Court addressed a similar situation. 143 The Supreme
Court found that a suit seeking the accounting of a trust and the
removal of a trustee was a quasi-in rem action.14 4 Because the relief
sought in both Dailey and Bathgate was similar to the relief sought in
Princess Lida, these actions should be considered quasi-in rem
within the meaning of Princess Lida.145
If the district court exercised jurisdiction, it could have issued
an order that conflicted with the Canadian order. The district
court was not concerned, however, about the danger of conflicting
decisions, stating that it would tailor its decision to match the Onta-
rio Court's decision.146 The district court failed to consider the
possibility of a reversal of the Canadian decision. 147 Furthermore,
142. Id. at 174-75. Both suits sought reallocation of surplus funds, an account-
ing of funds, restoration of funds to the trust, removal of the Pension Society as
trustee and appointment of a new trustee. Id. Only a small amount of the dam-
ages was personal in nature because only $469,841 was removed from the fund.
Bathgate, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830, at *67. Over $18 million was not removed.
The plaintiffs sought reallocation of the funds within the plan and did not sue the
defendants personally. Reply Brief for Appellants at 16, Dailey v. National Hockey
League, 987 F.2d 172 (3d Cir.) (No. 92-5156), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 67 (1993).
143. See Dailey, 987 F.2d at 177; see also Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 466.
144. See Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 466; see also Ewald v. Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co., 242 F.2d 319, 321 (6th Cir. 1957) (holding that requests for accounting
and removal of trustee constituted quasi-in rem action); Shaw v. Interstate Bank of
Wisconsin, 695 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (listing classic components of
dispute over trust administration: removal of trustees, appointment of new trust-
ees, accounting and restoration of funds to trust).
145. Neither Dailey nor Bathgate should be considered in personam. In South-
western Bank & Trust v. Metcalf State Bank, the only relief sought was money dam-
ages against the trustee mitigating against the application of the Princess Lida
doctrine. 525 F.2d 140, 142 (10th Cir. 1975). The Tenth Circuit stated that the
key difference between Princess Lida and Southwestern was that in Southwestern, re-
moval of the trustee was not requested. See id. at 143. Dailey also differs from
Southwestern because removal of the trustee was sought in Dailey and no personal
liability of the trustee was asserted. For examples of other in personam actions, see
supra note 61.
146. Dailey, 780 F. Supp. at 268. ChiefJudge Gerry of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey stated:
Given the current posture of the two lawsuits, however, it seems virtually
certain that a decision will be rendered in the Canadian action well
before this court has reached a stage at which we could consider ordering
relief. We will therefore have the benefit of knowing what relief has been
ordered by the Canadian court and we will be able to tailor our own or-
der accordingly.
Id.
147. See Dailey, 987 F.2d at 177 n.4. On February 17, 1994, the Ontario Court
of Appeals affirmed the Ontario Court ofJustice's Bathgate ruling. Bathgate v. Na-
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there was no reason for a United States decision if the United States
court was predetermined to follow the Canadian decision.148
For comity reasons, the Third Circuit correctly expanded the
application of the Princess Lida doctrine to foreign courts.1 49 In
Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp.,' 50 the Second Circuit applied the Prin-
cess Lida doctrine to a case involving a foreign court.15' In Dailey,
comity is especially important because the other foreign jurisdic-
tion involved is Canada. 52 The plaintiffs would not suffer if Dailey
was dismissed, 153 therefore, the district court should defer to Can-
ada "in a spirit of international cooperation." 54 Because the ac-
tions in both Dailey and Bathgate were quasi-in rem and due to the
overriding concern in extending comity to the Canadian court, the
Third Circuit correctly dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint in Dailey.
B. Loss of ERISA Protections
The loss of the plaintiffs' ERISA claims should not affect the
applicability of the Princess Lida doctrine. Levy is distinguishable
from Dailey because Levy did not address ERISA claims in a Princess
Lida context.' 55 Furthermore, the federal court in Levy preempted
all state common law claims because the other court was a state
court and not a foreign court.156 While preemption prevents state
tional Hockey League Pension Society, No. C13737, 1994 Ont. C.A. LEXIS 43
(Ont. C.A. Feb. 17, 1994); NHL Must Pay Ex-players Millions in Pension Money, PmLA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 18, 1994, at D3. The NHL is considering taking further action in
the Canadian courts. See id.
148. Even though the district court would not be bound by the Ontario Court
of Justice, under the district court's "pragmatic" approach, it would have to rule
according to the Canadian court in order to avoid conflicting orders.
149. See Dailey, 987 F.2d at 175-76. In Fleeger v. Clarkson Co., 86 F.R.D. 388,
392 (N.D. Tex. 1980), the court stated that "[t] he rationale for comity dismissals is
not based simply on lack of familiarity with the particular foreign law, but rather is
in deference to the foreign country's legal, judicial, legislative, and administrative
system of handling disputes over which it has jurisdiction."
150. 927 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1991). For a discussion of Chesley, see supra notes
79-81 and accompanying text.
151. Chesley, 927 F.2d at 66. Judge Alito incorrectly asserted that the majority
viewed Chesley as requiring automatic dismissal of an action brought in federal
court if an action was already brought in a foreign court. See Dailey, 987 F.2d at 179
n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting). The majority cited Chesley as an example of how the
Princess Lida doctrine was applicable in a case involving a foreign court. See id. at
175-76.
152. See Teeger, 86 F.R.D. at 393 (stating that if court cannot extend comity to
Canada, comity principle has little vitality in American jurisprudence).
153. See infra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text.
154. Feeger, 86 F.R.D. at 392.
155. See Dailey, 987 F.2d at 178.
156. See Levy, 635 F.2d at 967; see also ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988) (ERISA
preemption provision). For a discussion of ERISA preemption, see David Gregory,
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courts from hearing plaintiffs' claims, it does not preclude a foreign
court from adjudicating a parallel claim and providing the same
types of relief.157 Also, the ability to try an ERISA claim will not
have any effect if the decision conflicts with the Canadian court.158
Canadian pension law may be less favorable to the retired NHL
players because Canada does not have a law equivalent to ERISA.159
However, the holding in Piper allows a court to dismiss an action
even though the law in the alternative forum is less favorable to the
plaintiff.160 Although Piper involved forum non conveniens, it still
applies to Dailey.161 If a federal court may dismiss an action using a
discretionary doctrine such as forum non conveniens, it must dis-
miss an action under a compulsory doctrine like Princess Lida.162
The plaintiffs were not unfairly prejudiced by the loss of their ER-
ISA claims because the Canadian courts provide an adequate
forum.
The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 427 (1987); Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial
lexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 109 (1985).
157. See Brief for Appellants at 24, Dailey v. National Hockey League, 987 F.2d
172 (3d Cir.)(No. 92-5156), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 67 (1993). Congress' intent
would not be frustrated by the plaintiffs' loss of the ERISA claims because Con-
gress was concerned with problems of state common law claims, not of foreign
claims. See H.R REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655.
158. Because the district court would not have issued a conflicting order, any
advantage the plaintiffs would have had by being able to try their ERISA claims
would have been negated if it resulted in an order that conflicted with the Cana-
dian court's order.
159. However, Canadian pension law does not appear to be less favorable to
the plaintiffs because the Ontario Court ofJustice granted virtually all of the relief
requested by the plaintiffs. See Bathgate, 1992 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1830, at *186-89.
160. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981). In Piper, the alter-
native jurisdiction was less favorable to the plaintiffs because they were unable to
pursue a strict liability claim in Scottish courts. Id.
161. See Dailey, 987 F.2d at 178.
162. See id. at 178-79. In leeger, the district court stated that "even if Canadian
law did not supply the substantive cause of action, [it] would still hesitate to take
jurisdiction." Fleeger v. Clarkson Co., 86 F.R.D. 388, 393 (N.D. Tex. 1980). The
court noted that the plaintiff voluntarily purchased shares in a Canadian corpora-
tion, thereby putting him on notice that his shareholder rights would be construed
according to Canadian law. Id. For a discussion of Feeger, see supra notes 115-18
and accompanying text.
Likewise, the NHL Plan contains a choice-of-law provision stating that the
agreement should be construed according to the laws of Canada and its provinces.
See Brief for Appellants at 8, Dailey v. National Hockey League, 987 F.2d 172 (3d
Cir.) (No. 92-5156), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 67 (1993). Therefore, the plaintiffs in
Dailey should have been on notice that their rights would be construed according
to Canadian law.
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VI. IMPACr
In Dailey, the Princess Lida doctrine prevailed over Congress'
statutory determination that federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to hear claims involving ERISA violations. Congress has no au-
thority to order a foreign court to exercise or withdraw
jurisdiction. 63 Thus Dailey exploits a loophole in ERISA's exclusive
jurisdiction provision: if plaintiffs bring a quasi-in rem action in a
foreign court first, a federal court will not be able to exercise juris-
diction if a subsequent quasi-in rem action is brought involving the
same trust property.
Dailey holds an important place in pension law. Dailey forces
employees who are able to file suit in more than one country to
consider whether they wish to seek relief under ERISA. If employ-
ees wish to allege violations of ERISA, they must file suit in a United
States district court before any other filings to prevent dismissal on
Princess Lida grounds. The United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania has already dismissed such a case based
on Dailey.' 64 Therefore, athletes and employees must be careful to
preserve federal jurisdiction by filing in a United States district
court before any other filings.
By declining to exercise jurisdiction, the Third Circuit ac-
cepted the proposition that comity is more important than ensur-
ing exclusive federal jurisdiction. The Third Circuit made the
correct decision because the implications of violating comity reach
far wider than denying the plaintiff a claim where adequate relief
already exists. 165 As long as the law of the foreign jurisdiction is not
wholly inadequate, other jurisdictions should not hesitate to follow
Dailey and defer to the foreign court.
Candice I. Polsky
163. See Brief for Appellants at 24, Dailey v. National Hockey League, 987 F.2d
172 (3d Cir.) (No. 92-5156), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 67 (1993).
164. See Asbestos Workers Local 14 v. Hargrove, No. CIVA.93-0728, 1993 WL
183990, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 1993). The district court dismissed the case even
though "important federal policies and laws" were involved. Id. at *5.
165. A plaintiff could avoid losing ERISA claims by filing first in the United
States. See Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex reL Schnader, 294 U.S. 189,
195 (1935).
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